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PREFACE: THE SECOND GENERATION
OF SECOND AMENDMENT LAW &
POLICY
ERIC M. RUBEN AND DARRELL A. H. MILLER∗
The cacophonous and charged public debate over gun policy reflects a nation
deeply divided about the appropriate balance between gun rights and gun
regulation.1 The Second Amendment often dominates that debate—as both a
symbol and a right enforceable in the courts. On April 8, 2016, scholars from
diverse disciplinary backgrounds met at New York University School of Law to
present new scholarship, a second generation of research, about this important
constitutional provision.2 This issue is the product of that dialogue.
Of course, a second generation implies that there was a first generation. The
first generation of scholarship ended in 2008, when the Supreme Court issued the
most important Second Amendment decision in the Court’s history—District of
Columbia v. Heller.3 That first generation focused on a single question: Does the
Second Amendment protect an individual right to keep and bear arms for selfdefense, or a collective right connected to the maintenance of a well-regulated
militia?
This question garnered relatively little attention before the early twentieth
century. Before then, federal gun control, as we understand it today, did not exist,
and Second Amendment issues rarely arose. As Judge Thomas Cooley wrote in
1868: “How far it is in the power of the legislature to regulate [the Second
Amendment] right, we shall not undertake to say, as happily there has been very
little occasion to discuss that subject by the courts.”4 To be sure, many states and
localities regulated weapons and some of these regulations were challenged on
state constitutional law grounds.5 But generally these laws did not generate
sustained Second Amendment analysis in light of the understanding, set forth
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1. See generally Chris Murphy, Keynote: The Second Generation of Second Amendment Law &
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2. The symposium was sponsored by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University
School of Law and Law and Contemporary Problems at Duke University School of Law.
3. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding for the first time that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms).
4. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 350 (1868).
5. See generally Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law History in the United States and Second Amendment
Rights, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017 (surveying gun laws throughout American history).
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most famously in Barron v. Baltimore,6 that the Bill of Rights limited only the
federal government.7
By the early 1900s, however, urbanization, crime, and the increased lethality
of concealable weapons prompted calls for reform.8 State and local governments
were the first to heed the calls, passing broad restrictions on the possession and
carrying of handguns,9 but federal regulation was on the horizon. The
opportunity to address the meaning of the Second Amendment right had arrived.
Legal commentators in the first half of the twentieth century came to a fairly
uniform conclusion: the Second Amendment protected a collective, not
individual, right.10 The right was primarily concerned with the maintenance of a
“well regulated Militia.”11 Thus, the Second Amendment would not prevent the
federal government from passing laws targeting the possession and use of guns in
crime. A 1915 essay by Maine Supreme Court Justice Lucilius A. Emery in the
Harvard Law Review summarized the basis for this position, noting that “the
right guaranteed is not so much to the individual for his private quarrels or feuds
as to the people collectively for the common defense against the common enemy,
foreign or domestic.”12
Later, in 1934, the very first volume of Law and Contemporary Problems
included an article mirroring this understanding, opining that “no regulation or
restriction of firearms or weapons is in conflict with [the Second] Amendment
unless it substantially impedes the maintenance of a militia sufficiently wellequipped to assure the safety of the state.”13 That same year, Congress enacted
the first federal law that could reasonably be called national gun control, the

6. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
7. While some scattered contrarian state court decisions disagreed about the reach of the Bill of
Rights, they were the exception, not the rule. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION 153–56 (1998) (describing Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846) and similar opinions
as “contrarian” and in conflict with Barron).
8. See Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 473,
473 (1915) (“The greater deadliness of small firearms easily carried upon the person, the alarming
frequency of homicides and felonious assaults with such arms, the evolution of a distinct class of criminals
known as ‘gunmen’ from their ready use of such weapons for criminal purposes, are now pressing home
the question of the reason, scope, and limitation of the constitutional guaranty of a right to keep and bear
arms,—of the extent of its restraint upon the legislative power and duty to prohibit acts endangering the
public peace or the safety of the individual.”).
9. See ADAM WINKLER, GUN FIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN
AMERICA 204–10 (2011) (describing the Sullivan Law, an early New York permitting requirement for
the purchase and possession of handguns; the Revolver Act, which was adopted by multiple states shortly
afterward to mandate permits for concealed weapons; and the Uniform Firearms Act, which similarly
regulated handguns).
10. See Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment, in THE SECOND
AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY: HISTORIANS AND CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS ON THE RIGHT
TO BEAR ARMS 16, 24–25, 36–37 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000) (counting eleven law review articles discussing
the Second Amendment between 1912 and 1959, each of which espoused the militia-related
interpretation).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
12. Emery, supra note 8, at 477.
13. John Brabner-Smith, Firearm Regulation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 400, 412 (1934).
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National Firearms Act.14 More than ever before, the National Firearms Act
provided the occasion for the Supreme Court to consider the scope of the Second
Amendment.
In 1939, in United States v. Miller, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the
National Firearms Act’s prohibition on interstate transport of short-barreled
shotguns.15 In so doing, the Court confirmed the growing consensus in legal
scholarship about the meaning of the Second Amendment. “In the absence of
any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel
of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” the
Court explained, “we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the
right to keep and bear such an instrument.”16
Miller appeared to settle many Second Amendment questions, and for over
seventy years courts used it to turn away almost every Second Amendment
challenge to a gun regulation. But the scholarly investigation continued, and
gained momentum and financing with the rise of the modern gun rights
movement in the 1970s.17 Researchers mining historical sources found support
for a different understanding of the Second Amendment: one grounded in
individual self-defense, not militia service. At first, this scholarship was
considered an outlier. But with time, prominent legal scholars acknowledged the
potential merit of the individual-right view, including leading liberal law
professors such as Sanford Levinson and Laurence Tribe.18
Once the individual-right scholarship was in place, advocates began
challenging the militia-centric interpretation of the Second Amendment in court.
In District of Columbia v. Heller, seventy years after Miller, the Supreme Court
again considered the meaning and scope of the constitutional right to keep and
bear arms.19 This time, a bare majority of the Court emphatically adopted the
individual-right view, striking down a law banning the possession of operable
handguns in the home.20
Scholarship played a key role in Heller. There was almost no federal case law
precedent to guide the Court. The most proximate Supreme Court case, Miller,
was over half a century old and applied a vastly different interpretation of the

14. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–
5872 (2012)) (imposing a tax, registration requirement, and transfer restriction on certain machine guns
and short-barreled shotguns).
15. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
16. Id. at 178.
17. For discussions of the arc of modern Second Amendment scholarship before Heller, see
generally MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY (2014); WINKLER, supra
note 9; Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 191 (2008).
18. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 897 n.211 (3d ed. 2000); Sanford
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L. J. 637, 645–46 (1989).
19. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
20. Id.
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right.21 The Court in Heller could not rely solely, or even predominantly, on
common law reasoning from incremental changes typical to the development of
other constitutional rights. There was no slow buildup of favorable precedent, in
the way that desegregation cases ultimately led to Brown v. Board of Education.
The litigants and the Court had to draw on other sources from a relatively
modern generation of research by litigants, activists, and academics. The various
opinions in Heller cited close to twenty law review articles and at least a dozen
other scholarly publications.22
Two years after Heller, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court
invoked its incorporation doctrine and applied the Second Amendment as a
restraint on state and local governments.23 In so doing, the Court struck down a
handgun ban in Chicago that was similar to the law struck down in the District of
Columbia.24 With McDonald, the Second Amendment became an issue not only
for Congress and the federal government, but also for every state legislature,
county commissioner, and township trustee.
Heller and McDonald represent a significant shift in the constitutional
landscape for the right to keep and bear arms, but in one of the most cited
passages in both opinions the Court also emphasized that the right is not
unlimited, and that governments maintain broad regulatory authority.25 The right
announced in Heller and McDonald, the Court instructed, “[should not be taken
to] cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,’ ‘laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,
or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.’”26
The Court also noted historical consensus about the constitutionality of bans on
carrying concealed weapons.27 In a nod to other lawful regulations, the Court
cautioned that this short list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” is not
“exhaustive.”28
Heller and McDonald opened the floodgates to hundreds of lawsuits raising
a host of novel questions about the Second Amendment.29 A ban on handguns in
21. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. There was more recent state court precedent that
analyzed state constitutional provisions analogous to the Second Amendment. But the Court did not use
those modern cases as a resource. It certainly did not use this precedent to craft a reasonable regulation
model of the right. See Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
593, 594 (2006) (discussing state court decisions on state constitutional rights to keep and bear arms).
22. See Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
23. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
24. Id. at 749–50.
25. Id. at 786; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
26. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27).
27. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
28. Id. at 627 n.26.
29. See LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, POST-HELLER LITIGATION SUMMARY 1–2 (Mar.
31, 2015), http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Post-Heller-Litigation-Summary-March2015-Final-Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW5T-AD2D] (noting that after Heller courts have been
“inundated” with Second Amendment challenges, leading to over 900 decisions).
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the home may be unconstitutional, but what about bans on other types of
weapons? For restrictions less severe than handgun bans, what standard of review
should courts apply? What historical firearm measures not already identified by
the Supreme Court should be considered presumptively lawful? The list of
unanswered questions goes on and on.
We characterize the scholarship addressing this new wave of questions as the
second generation of Second Amendment scholarship. With this symposium and
this publication we seek to avoid rehashing old debates; instead, we aim to push
forward in new directions that can deepen our understanding of the Second
Amendment in the post-Heller world. The authors featured in the coming pages
are not of one discipline or mind. Analyzing gun rights and regulation through
myriad lenses—history, political science, philosophy, sociology, public health,
and law—furthers our understanding and broadens our perspective.
While this compilation is interdisciplinary by design, historical considerations
permeate the articles. The historical component in almost all of the contributions
reflects, in large part, the profound influence of Justice Antonin Scalia’s
jurisprudential legacy. Heller, by some accounts, was Scalia’s crowning doctrinal
achievement, “the finest example of what is now called ‘original public meaning’
jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”30 The opinion looked to
history not only to support the Court’s interpretation of the meaning of the
Second Amendment’s words, but also to support the validity of exceptions to
Second Amendment coverage. Restrictions that are sufficiently “longstanding,”
Heller instructs, are “presumptively lawful.”31
Thus, under Heller, a long regulatory lineage creates a strong presumption
that a given weapon regulation is constitutional. In The Right to Keep and Carry
Arms in Anglo-American Law: Preserving Liberty and Keeping the Peace,
historian Saul Cornell explores the lineage of one common category of
regulation: public carry restrictions.32 Examining an oft-overlooked resource,
Justice of the Peace manuals, Cornell describes a historically broad ability to
regulate public carry when and where it could disturb the peace. His provocative
(and ironic) conclusion is that the historical treatment of public carry rights and
regulations bears a close resemblance to the balancing view conveyed in Justice
Stephen Breyer’s Heller dissent, which itself is not inconsistent with the
originalist view in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion. Cornell finds that
“[s]omething analogous to a balancing exercise was fundamental to the way
Anglo-American law dealt with arms . . . . The liberty interest associated with the
right to arms was always balanced against the concept of the peace.”33

30. Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What it Says, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2008,
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121452412614009067 [https://perma.cc/Y8SP-L62S].
31. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 627 n.26.
32. See generally Saul Cornell, The Right to Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American Law:
Preserving Liberty and Keeping the Peace, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017.
33. Id. at 14.
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Whereas Cornell’s contribution is a deep historical dive into one restriction,
public carry laws, in Gun Law History in the United States and Second
Amendment Rights, political scientist Robert Spitzer provides a broad empirical
exposition of various gun regulations throughout American history. Spitzer
shows how gun laws were “ubiquitous” in American history and have “spanned
every conceivable category of regulation, from gun acquisition, sale, possession,
transport, and use, including deprivation of use through outright confiscation, to
hunting and recreational regulations, to registration and express gun bans.”34
Spitzer’s description demonstrates how regulation has tracked changes in
technology and public safety needs. One of the most interesting examples is
precedent dating to the 1920s for bans on weapons now known as assault rifles.
Such regulatory precedent begs a jurisprudential question that warrants further
attention: If the “arms” protected by the Second Amendment can evolve (as
Heller says they can35), then should the benchmark for what regulations are
“longstanding” and “presumptively lawful” also evolve? More generally, Spitzer
shows that gun rights and regulations need not be all or nothing. Indeed, “for the
first 300 years of America’s existence, gun laws and gun rights went hand-inhand.”36
History can buttress or undercut claims of permissible regulation under the
Heller paradigm, but it can also elucidate other contours of the right. In SelfDefense, Defense of Others, and the State,37 Darrell A. H. Miller describes the
historical interplay between the state and lawful self-defense, which Heller
instructs is “central to the Second Amendment right.”38 Miller shows that selfdefense always has “been heavily conditioned and constructed by the state.”39
Indeed, for much of English legal history, self-defense was not thought of as a
right at all, but rather an argument in favor of a pardon from the sovereign.40 The
fact that self-defense did not historically operate as a purely natural law right,
unconnected to public power, has legal and policy implications. Significantly, “[i]t
suggests that the state has a power, and perhaps an obligation, to ensure that
private capacity to render lethal force conforms to minimum standards of safety,
training, and discipline.”41
In Gendering the Second Amendment, sociologist Jennifer Carlson and
political scientist Kristin Goss analyze historical conceptions of the state and how
they are linked to gun rights. To assist in that endeavor, they consider the state
and gun rights through the lens of gender—an underdeveloped theoretical
framework in the Second Amendment debate. “[T]he exercise of gun rights and
34.
35.
36.
37.

Spitzer, supra note 5, at 56.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 582.
Spitzer, supra note 5, at 56.
Darrell A. H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 2, 2017.
38. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
39. Miller, supra note 37, at 86.
40. Id. at 89.
41. Id. at 87.
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responsibilities,” they note, “is and always has been gendered” just as the “the
state is and always has been gendered.”42 By tracing broad trends in American
governance vis-à-vis gender, and relating those trends back to gun policy and
practices, they offer an important perspective on the evolution of American gun
policy and culture. Gendering the Second Amendment is a positive development
in the scholarship dealing with the Second Amendment, especially because the
intersection of the Second Amendment and gender has been woefully
underexplored. Hopefully Carlson and Goss’s article will inspire additional
research on this topic.
Theoretical concepts like self-defense and gun rights have evolved over time
and, of course, technology has too. In 3D-Printed Firearms, Do-It-Yourself Guns,
& the Second Amendment, James Jacobs and Alex Haberman highlight
regulatory challenges presented by modern gunsmithing technology. Heller
suggested rules for what arms are protected by the Second Amendment—for
example, those “‘in common use at the time’ for lawful purposes like selfdefense”43—but it failed to establish clear guidance for dealing with new weapons
and weapon-making technology. In the years since Heller, 3D printers have made
increasingly sophisticated firearms, prompting widespread enforcement
concerns. If anyone can manufacture a gun at home, what good are mandatory
background checks? If guns can be constructed completely from plastic, might
they evade metal detectors? Jacobs and Haberman address these novel issues,
which will only become more relevant as technology advances. Though the
authors conclude that restricting the publication of weapon-making software
does not violate the Second Amendment, they also argue that 3D-printed guns
are “a modest technological development rather than a game changer” in light of
“how common gunsmithing has been, and is.”44 That said, with gun-making
technology rapidly evolving, it is “none too soon to bring 3D gunsmithing into
the debate about gun control.”45
As the articles in this issue reflect, history has played a significant role in
Second Amendment jurisprudence and scholarship since Heller. Nonetheless,
most lower courts have not applied a purely originalist methodology in deciding
Second Amendment challenges, and have relied instead on a mix of historical
analysis and tiered scrutiny.46 Many challenged laws are pronounced neither
categorically constitutional nor unconstitutional on historical grounds, but rather
are scrutinized under means–end scrutiny common in other doctrinal settings. It
is therefore often necessary to evaluate whether a governmental interest is
sufficiently important to justify an impingement, and also whether an
42. Jennifer Carlson & Kristin A. Goss, Gendering the Second Amendment, 80 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 2, 2017 at 103.
43. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624.
44. James B. Jacobs & Alex Haberman, 3D-Printed Firearms, Do-It-Yourself Guns & the Second
Amendment, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017 at 139–40.
45. Id. at 141.
46. See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second Amendment, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703 (2012).
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impingement is sufficiently necessary to achieve that interest. Several articles in
this issue address questions within this emerging paradigm.
In Justifying Perceptions in First and Second Amendment Doctrine, Eric M.
Ruben considers when the government’s interest in preserving the perception of
safety can justify a firearm restriction.47 That rationale was invoked to uphold a
ban on assault weapons in a recent Seventh Circuit case,48 sparking controversy
and raising a difficult doctrinal question: How can this justification be accepted
for a gun restriction if it would be unacceptable for a speech restriction? Ruben
concludes that the issue should be treated differently in the distinct context of the
right to keep and bear arms, though courts should only accept public safety
perceptions as a legitimate justification after they solve some doctrinal
difficulties, such as ensuring that public perceptions do not belie illicit animus.
Beyond historical and constitutional questions, critical policy issues remain
concerning the right to keep and bear arms, especially where different groups of
people have different capacities and authority to use deadly weapons and pose
different risks to themselves and others. In Implementation and Effectiveness of
Connecticut’s Risk-Based Gun Removal Law: Does It Prevent Suicides?, Jeffrey
W. Swanson and his co-authors provide empirical evidence that could both
motivate the adoption and justify the constitutionality of a particular gun policy:
risk-based gun removals.49 Risk-based gun removal procedures, which authorize
police to seize firearms in limited circumstances, have the potential to prevent
gun violence (to self or others) without creating a criminal record. Do they work?
According to Swanson et al., this mechanism, which has been adopted in
Connecticut, Indiana, and California, has proven effective for preventing the
most common type of gun death in America—suicide. Indeed, based on the
results of an ambitious mixed-methods empirical study, the authors estimate that
for every ten to twenty gun seizures, one suicide was prevented.50
In Lawful Gun Carriers (Police and Armed Citizens): License, Escalation, and
Race, Nicholas J. Johnson compares the formal and informal licenses and
behavior of two groups of lawful gun carriers: police and lawful private gun
carriers. According to one recent analysis, police in Florida are sanctioned for
firearms crimes at a higher rate than lawful private gun carriers, and other studies
show that such lawful private gun carriers commit far fewer crimes than do
members of the general public.51 Thus, criminal behavior cannot be explained by
the mere carrying of a gun. Rather, Johnson argues, it is best explained by the
47. Eric M. Ruben, Justifying Perceptions in First and Second Amendment Doctrine, 80 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017.
48. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 447
(2015).
49. Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s Risk-Based Gun
Removal Law: Does It Prevent Suicides?, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017.
50. See id.
51. Nicholas J. Johnson, Lawful Gun Carriers (Police and Armed Citizens): License, Escalation, and
Race, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017 at 220 n.52 (citing CRIME PREVENTION RES. CTR.,
CONCEALED CARRY PERMIT HOLDERS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 7–8 (2014)).
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scope of the two groups’ respective firearm licenses: narrow for civilians and
broad for police. Among other things, this conclusion about the role of a license
“cuts against the argument that private gun carriers are a hazard because they
are not trained like police.”52 More provocatively, this conclusion frames a
normative question raised at the end of Johnson’s article: “why should [lawful
private gun carriers] be less welcome in the community than police?”53
Finally, the last two pieces in the issue provide commentary by two featured
speakers at the April 8, 2016 symposium: Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and
Sanford Levinson. Murphy’s keynote assesses the dysfunctional politics of gun
rights and regulation. Murphy describes how the political left and right occupy
“different planets” when it comes to firearm policies: the left is primarily
concerned with “concrete details of gun laws” and the right is primarily
concerned with “abstract concepts of liberty and freedom and revolution.”54 To
reach “a common road to common ground,” Murphy suggests some ways leaders
can “fix the bugs in the system that cause us to talk past each other.”55
Sanford Levinson has been a leading thinker about the Second Amendment
since he published The Embarrassing Second Amendment over twenty-five years
ago.56 In his postscript to this issue, Levinson provides insightful observations
about how notions of sovereignty have informed understandings of gun rights,
regulation, and self-defense.57 Building on the contributions of Saul Cornell and
Darrell A. H. Miller, Levinson offers an erudite and fascinating postscript to
close the symposium. His final line highlights the urgency of continuing to
grapple with what counts as legitimate violence in America: “[E]ven those of us
who are onlookers, so to speak, neither directly inflicting the violence nor bearing
its brunt, have reason to be concerned about the circumstances of its occurrence
given both the moral questions surrounding them and the sheer political and
social consequences for the societies we live in.”58
The second generation of Second Amendment scholarship is still in its early
years, and the articles presented in this issue raise as many questions as they
answer. This publication will hopefully be an incubator, leading to other efforts
to build on and respond to the arguments contained in this symposium. Forwardthinking scholarship, after all, will continue to play a uniquely significant role in
Second Amendment law and policy for years to come. Our hope is that this
symposium, if nothing else, will motivate further research to advance the
understanding of this polarizing and fascinating Amendment.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 210.
Id. at 230.
Murphy, supra note 1, at 233–34.
Id. at 238.
See Levinson, supra note 18.
Sanford Levinson, Postscript: Some Observations About Guns and Sovereignty, 80 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017.
58. Id. at 251.

